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Abstract: Terrorist groups use their own websites in 
order to recruit novices, distribute propaganda and 
build a specific identity. In our paper we describe this 
form of strategic communication from a theoretical 
perspective and then expose the methodological design 
and results of a critical discourse analysis by which we 
examined texts from the websites of Hezbollah, Gama’a 
al-Islamiyya and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 
Findings show that the groups use different strategies of 
identity building. However, the strategies of 
construction and justification play a major role in each 
group. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Theories and dimensions of identity as well as 
concepts of identity building are important in 
delivering insights into how terrorist organizations 
establish their identities through online texts and 
what mechanisms they use to mobilize and connect to 
their target audiences. To find out how terrorist 
organizations build their identities online, an analysis 
of the discourse used in the website texts of three 
religiously motivated terrorist groups was conducted. 
Analysis of online texts highlights important elements 
such as persuasive/strategic communication and 
written language strategies. Moreover, an increasing 
number of people receive their information from the 
Internet; hence analyzing this communication channel 
has proven to be extremely relevant and informative 
of terrorists’ innovative media usage. 
In this article we will, first, describe why people 
engage in religious terrorism, second, present 
concepts of identity, and third, explain the critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) approach in the context of 
strategic communication. After having laid out our 
theoretical framework we will then, fourth, describe 
the research design of our empirical study, fifth, 
present important results in a comparative way, and 
sixth, end with a conclusion, critical discussion and 
outlook on future research possibilities. 
 
II. TYPES OF TERRORISM 
 
In their book “Violence as Communication” Alex P. 
Schmid and Janny de Graaf (1982) discuss two distinct 
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types of terrorism: repressive/vigilante/state 
terrorism and insurgent terrorism. They divide 
insurgent terrorism into three subcategories: social-
revolutionary terrorism which “aims at taking power 
and at revolutionizing the whole society” (Schmid & de 
Graaf, 1982: 59), separatist terrorism that “calls for 
secession of an ethnical or national group from a state” 
(Schmid & de Graaf, 1982: 59), and single-issue 
terrorism, i. e. “ad hoc terrorism by one or a few 
individuals advocating coercively that the state grant 
some privilege to a group with which the terrorist 
sympathizes” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982: 60). In our 
study, we will take into consideration only insurgent 
terrorism. 
Terrorism is driven by various causes and can 
pursue diverse objectives. Hence, we find different 
types of terrorism that create and are aimed at 
different identities. Terrorist groups can be 
distinguished by the reasons that lead to the arousal 
and strengthening of their motives. Typologies of 
terrorism enable a greater conceptual clarity, help 
order complex data and can be practically applied to 
political as well as social realms (Marsden and Schmid, 
2013). A categorization must be based on terrorism 
characteristics that are perceived as important and 
salient in providing crucial information that allow us 
to decipher identity building strategies. As terrorism is 
of relevance to different realms such as political 
sciences, sociology, or communication sciences, 
different typologies have emerged that are adjusted to 
various needs (e.g. Marsden and Schmid, 2013; 
Hirschmann, 2003; Piazza, 2009). 
For the present study we will use a typology 
suggested by Waldmann (2001). In Waldmann’s 
typology the term “terrorism” focuses on terrorists’ 
motives and self-concepts, and differentiates 
nationalistic, social-revolutionary as well as religiously 
motivated terrorism. Thus, it seems appropriate for 
our purpose. In this paper, we will concentrate on 
groups that belong to the religious motivation type. 
Terrorism is often also related to extremism. 
Nevertheless, extremism cannot be seen as an original 
trigger of terrorism, but as “an intermediate cause” 
(Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of 
Law, 2008a: 16): Extremist ideologies and identities – 
regardless of whether political or religious in nature – 
are a consequence rather than a cause and result from 
political, religious, or societal dissatisfaction 
(Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of 
Law, 2008a). Terrorism, thus, can rather be seen as 
the highest level of extremism escalation (Hirschmann, 
2003) and it can be traced back to religious, ethnic-
nationalist and socialist motivations, as shown in the 
typology. 
However, it is sometimes hard to identify the 
causes and motivational forces of terrorists because 
the original factors, that had once been the trigger to 
engage in terrorism, may be substituted by other 
reasons. This is especially the case the longer the 
terrorist organization exists and the longer a certain 
terrorist campaign lasts (Schmid, 2013b). Terrorist 
acts provoke counter-measurements that, in turn, may 
provoke other terrorist acts – during this cycle the 
original reasons may get lost and the terrorist group 
focuses on other motives such as “(1) cycles of 
revenge; (2) the need of the group to provide for its 
members and the survival of the group itself; and (3) 
the rationale of not giving up profitable criminal 
activities originally initiated to sustain the group” 
(Schmid, 2013b: 15-16). Even the identity of a group 
can change from, e. g., religious to nationalist or be a 
mixture of both. 
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Another reason why people engage in terrorism is 
found in rapid modernization and high economic 
growth (Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the 
Rule of Law, 2008a: 16): “When traditional norms and 
social patterns crumble or are made to seem 
irrelevant, new radical ideologies that are sometimes 
based on religion or perhaps nostalgia for a glorious 
past, may become attractive to certain segments of 
society”. Globalization especially is an important factor 
within this context: According to Bird, Blomberg, and 
Hess (2008), people who engage in terrorism have the 
impression that only already wealthy economies 
benefit from globalization – poorer countries, on the 
contrary, are perceived as not having benefited from 
globalization. Terrorist acts are then designed to show 
the people’s dissatisfaction. 
In summary, it can be said that terrorism is 
triggered by complex social and political 
circumstances that people are unsatisfied with. 
Especially when under the impression that their 
concerns and opinions are not being respected, people 
may engage in terrorism because they perceive this as 
the only way to express their dissatisfaction and force 
a government to change the status quo. But as Schmid 
(2013b) outlined, terrorism is a cycle that is hard to 
break as terrorists may substitute their original 
objectives with new motives that will justify their 
actions. All these objectives are communicated on 
groups’ websites where terrorists strive to create a 
specific identity by using strategic communication. 
 
III. CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY 
 
Manuel Castells begins his work with this 
statement: “Our world, and our lives, are being shaped 
by the conflicting trends of globalization and identity.” 
(Castells, 1997: 1) According to Castells, networks 
play a decisive role in the modern-day world. He 
considers a “widespread surge of powerful 
expressions of collective identity” (Castells, 1997: 2). 
Furthermore, the historical development of a specific 
culture is crucial for the evolvement of identity. Below 
we will describe Castells’ notion of identity in detail 
and then complement it with some other views on 
identity. The importance of resorting to a theoretical 
framework before delving into the empirical study can 
be simply explained with Castells’ words: “social 
theory is a tool to understand the world” (Castells, 
1997: 3)  
Identity is closely linked to an individual’s own 
perception of self and the social world. “Identity is 
people’s source of meaning and experience.” (Castells, 
1997: 6) Castells divides identity into: gender, 
religious, national, ethnic, territorial, socio-biological 
(cf. Castells, 1997: 2). Our interest lies in the religious 
dimension. Castells further differentiates social roles 
of identity such as being a daughter, sportsperson, 
smoker, neighbor, etc. These roles are defined by 
norms that are also structured by societal institutions 
and organization (cf. Castells, 1997: 7). Complete 
identities, on the contrary, arise only when they are 
fully internalized by the individual; “identities are 
stronger sources of meaning than roles, because of the 
process of self-construction and individuation that 
they involve. In simple terms, identities organize the 
meaning while roles organize the functions.” (Castells, 
1997: 7) “Meaning” is defined as “the symbolic 
identification by a social actor of the purpose of 
his/her action.” (Castells, 1997: 7) 
In general, individuals extract their main meaning 
out of a primordial identity. “By identity, as it refers to 
social actors, I understand the process of construction 
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of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or 
related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given 
priority over other sources of meaning. For a given 
individual, or for a collective actor, there may be a 
plurality of identities.” (Castells, 1997: 6) The more 
identities an individual combines, the stronger the 
feeling of disruption, dissatisfaction and desire to 
concentrate on fewer, perhaps just one identity, can be. 
Religion is often found to be a very dominant identity 
if the believer subjugates all other desires to this 
central category.  
Castells (1997: 7) assumes that any identity is a 
construction that can constantly be changed, enforced 
or fragmented, depending on which identity the 
individual is inclined to or – and that is where the 
terrorist website texts come into play – how the 
creators of a specific collective identity manage to 
establish it as a driving force via strategic 
communication.  
Castells distinguishes three forms of identity: 
legitimizing identity, resistance identity and project 
identity. Most activities of insurgent terrorist groups 
fall under the category of “resistance identity”. Thus, 
terrorists number among “those actors that are in 
positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by 
the logic of domination, thus building trenches of 
resistance and survival on the basis of principles 
different from, or opposed to, those permeating the 
institutions of society” (Castells, 1997: 8). Castells 
identifies this type of identity as the most important in 
our current society (cf. Castells, 1997: 9). Religion, in 
his view, is “a most important source of constructing 
identity in the network society” (Castells, 1997: 12). 
Religion is a frequent part of collective identity 
building as it occurs on all three societal levels: 
individual (micro), organizational (meso) and societal 
(macro). 
Combining personal and social identity theories 
(micro-macro link) in his discussion of identity 
building, Erikson (1974) states that there are two 
components of an identity: a personal segment based 
on an individual’s history and the solving of adolescent 
identity crises; and a social segment based on 
acceptance of self-perception within society. There are 
several dimensions and characteristics to identity, 
such as religious or cultural ones. Damon (1983) 
identified that religion provides a distinct social group 
for an individual to belong to and agree with, both 
ideologically and socially. Also, King (2003: 197) 
argues that “religion provides a distinct setting for 
identity exploration and commitment through offering 
ideological, social, and spiritual contexts.” 
 “What the specific notion of identity adds to a 
basic sociological or cultural framework is the sense of 
Agency, that we construct our own identities out of the 
options afforded to us by our general positionality and 
our particular trajectory of experiences, encounters, 
options for action, and so forth.” (Lemke, 2008: 21) 
One of these options is the “encounter” with internet 
texts, pieces of temporarily fixed discourse, that might 
(re-)shape one’s identity. The goal of these texts is that 
the readers start identifying with this social group; the 
language used is supposed to create an attachment, a 
sense of belonging. 
Language is one of the most important means for 
generating meaning; in order to detect the 
construction of identity through, by and in language, 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) seems to be most 
suitable. 
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IV. DISCOURSE AS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
 
“[A]ll social phenomena and objects obtain their 
meaning(s) through discourse, which is defined as a 
structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated 
and constructed” (Laclau, 1988: 254). Thus, discourse 
is the result of articulation. The underlying 
assumption is that meanings can be examined; 
however, “social reality” cannot be detected as it is 
elusive due to many influencing factors. That is why 
CDA belongs to the so-called “sensitizing concepts“: 
they indicate a certain direction but no fixed and pre-
assigned research approach. “It should finally be 
stressed that, contrary to what is often assumed 
outside of the field, Discourse Analysis is not a method 
of research, but a (cross) discipline.” (Van Dijk, 2011: 6) 
“The defined and delimited set of statements that 
constitute a discourse are themselves expressive of 
and organized by a specific ideology. That is, ideology 
and discourse are aspects of the same phenomenon, 
regarded from two different standpoints.” (Kress, 
1985: 30) That is why the bargaining of power, based 
on ideologies such as religious frameworks, is a crucial 
element in discourses; “the social construction of 
identity always takes place in a context marked by 
power relationships” (Castells, 1997: 7). Frequently, 
this construction manifests itself in a defensive 
communicative reaction (resistance identity). It is an 
assumption of CDA that language is never neutral but 
evolves in socio-cultural interaction between 
individuals and groups (cf. Hodges & Nilep1, 2007: 4). 
Thus, discourses are always only partly fixed and can 
be challenged by discourse-external elements that 
hinder a broadly accepted meaning. 
 “If discourses are the organizations of ideological 
materials in discursive forms, and if these discourses 
exist in an already established repertoire of discourses 
in a social group, then the individual speaker will not 
in fact be creating the discourse but rather will simply 
reproduce the discourse that she or he has previously 
learned.” (Kress, 1985: 31) This makes us think that a 
recipient of discourse presented on a terrorist group 
website could – in a follow-up communication – 
reproduce this discourse, its content and the ideology 
presented there. It could thereby influence and/or 
strengthen his and others’ religious identity 
construction. In addition: “The discursive fields which 
structure our understandings of war and terrorism 
also serve to legitimize and delegitimize violent 
struggles.” (Heath-Kelly, Jarvis & Baker-Beall, 2014: 2) 
On this foundation of theories of identity and CDA, 
we conducted an empirical study in order to answer 
the following research question: What strategies of 
identity building do the three religious terrorist 
groups use to portray themselves as well as others (e. 
g. competing groups, government) on their websites 
and how do they express their identity, history, and 
goals? 
 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The starting point for the research at hand was the 
CDA codebook developed by Wodak et al. (2009: 36-
42), originally composed from and for an analysis of 
the discursive construction of Austrian national 
identity. In order to draw conclusions about discursive 
identity building, Wodak et al. (2009) classified the 
means and forms of language of Austrian politicians 
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and categorized them into argumentative schemes and 
greater discursive strategies.  
On the basis of the developed coding scheme, we 
evaluated the phrases and identified their discursive 
meaning. From that point we inferred the identity of 
the writer / group in order to discover and describe 
the relationship between textual and social processes. 
The originally used categories were, however, 
modified since we focused on the discourse of 
terrorist groups on their web pages. Adaptations of 
categories were made conformable to the theoretical 
foundations of terrorism and strategic communication. 
Thus, five greater strategy categories, with up to five 
sub-strategies, were used for our analysis:  
1) Strategies of justification and relativization 
are used in order to capture the organization’s 
attempt to correct and reason facts and 
circumstances complying with the organization’s 
own ideology. Put in a simplified manner, the 
organization thereby offers the answer to the 
question of who we are and what we do, in 
relation to others (usually perceived and 
presented as enemies).  
2) Constructive strategies capture an 
organization’s attempt to constitute a community 
spirit and recruit new members by legitimizing 
its own deeds by emphasizing sameness, 
assimilation, inclusion, belonging and unification. 
The explanations of who we are and what we do 
(non-related to others) play the most important 
roles here. 
3) Perpetuation strategies are used in order to 
emphasize the intolerability of the status quo and 
occasionally to mention the necessity of 
continuation of the organization’s existence, its 
ideology and actions. 
4) Strategies of transformation, on the other hand, 
underline the desire for change that is already 
proposed. These strategies are used in order to 
once again answer the question of the 
organization’s goals and aims, thus what we want 
but related to future or (glorious) past times. 
5) Strategies of demontage and destruction, 
finally, are used in order to answer the question 
of who they (enemies) are, usually by discrediting 
opponents by means of derogatory terms, 
pejorative attribution and defamation. The 
emphasis of otherness plays an important role 
within these strategies.  
The point of departure for the sampling of the 
present research were religious terrorist groups that 
are rather big, well-known and have an English 
website. Another criterion was that we wanted groups 
from three different countries. The three websites 
analyzed in the paper at hand belong to: 1) Hezbollah, 
2) the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and 3) Al-
Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Overall the analysis covered 13 
online articles including “About us”, mission 
statements and press releases. The coding was 
completed by an international coder team2 using the 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) MAXQDA3. We ensured intercoder 
reliability by constant exchange of information and 
double-codings. 
At this point, we will give a short overview of the 
respective groups. 
1)  Hezbollah emerged as a homogenous 
organization in the mid 1980s. The organization 
justifies its existence as being an answer to the 
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Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In Hezbollah’s 
founding documents the Iranian revolution is the 
source of inspiration and an example of “what 
can be done when the faithful gather under the 
banner of Islam”. Furthermore “[o]nly Islam can 
bring about men’s renaissance, progress and 
creativity”. Hezbollah positioned itself “neither 
East nor West” and describes its enemies as “the 
countries of the arrogant world” lead by the USA 
and its “spearhead” Israel. Both are described as 
imperialistic forces and major enemies of Islam 
(Norton, 2009: 36-37). The main goal of 
Hezbollah is a Lebanon free from “occupiers” and 
based on Sharia – the (Shia) Islamic law. The 
organization conducts kidnappings, hijackings, 
bombings etc. However since 2006, Hezbollah 
distances itself from the founding documents 
declaring them as “obsolete” (ibid.: 41-46). 
2)  The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) was 
the self-proclaimed name of the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan during the Taliban regime. The 
Taliban came to power in the mid-1990s with the 
aim to end the civil war that emerged after the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union. In the beginning, 
as a militant group of students led by Mullah 
Omar, IEA promoted Islam as the best alternative 
to civil war and ethnic divisions between the 
Afghan tribes. Influenced by Wahhabi teachers 
and Pashtun tribal traditions, the organization 
installed strict and conservative interpretations 
of Sunni Islam as the state law. Islam was thereby 
the only religion accepted within the state 
borders. As such, the state was supported and 
ratified by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. In the aftermath of September 
11th 2001 the United States military forces 
removed the Taliban from power under the 
accusation of providing shelter for Osama bin 
Laden, as well as for organizing training camps 
for international terrorists (Oxford Islamic 
Studies Online, 2014; Rashid, 2010). From then 
on the members of the organization operate 
underground, most likely based in the tribal areas 
of Pakistan. 
3)  Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI) was originally an 
alliance of loosely networked cells of Egyptian 
students, who banned everything that did not 
conform to the (Sunni) Islamic law. The second 
common denominator of the network members 
was the opposition to the Egyptian government’s 
peace negotiations and policy towards Israel (cf. 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism, 2014; Kepel 2003: 
151; The institute for the Study of Violent Groups, 
2012). In 1997 the organization made an 
agreement with the Egyptian government 
intending to desist from violent actions on both 
sides. However, not all members supported the 
agreement and the organization dissolved. The 
branch led by Mustafa Hamza supported the 
ceasefire. The other one, led by Rifa’i Taha Musa, 
continued armed operations, is still active and 
represents the largest militant group in Egypt. It 
cooperates with Al-Qaeda continuously (Council 
of Foreign Relations, 2014; National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2013). 
The comparison of the three organizations reveals 
some similarities. Firstly, their denotations are 
strongly associated with religion and/or God: 
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Hezbollah denotes “Party of God”; IEA contains the 
word “Emirate”, which depicts a state under Allah; and 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya stands for “The Islamic Group”. 
Secondly, their opponents are commonly labeled as 
“enemies of Islam”. Thirdly, their first aim is the 
installation of Sharia – the Islamic law – within state 
borders. Fourthly, the final Goal for each of them is the 
so-called Umma – a meta-state of all Muslims with 
Allah as lawmaker. Lastly, they all use similar methods 
including: kidnapping, hijacking, skyjackings, suicide 
bombings etc. 
However, the analyzed organizations demonstrate 
some differences as well. First, they all emerged in 
different countries. Second, the emergence was 
triggered by different events over different periods of 
time. Third, they belong to different branches of Islam 
(IEA and GAI are Sunni, while Hezbollah is Shia) and 
are consequently supported by different states as 
sponsors. And finally, even though they all describe 
their opponents as „the enemies of Islam“, the 
concrete enemies are partly different. In case of 
Hezbollah it is the USA and Israel. For IEA it is the 
western world and democracy (symbolized by the 
USA). And in case of GAI the major enemies are the 
secular governments of Egypt and Israel.  
 
VI. RESULTS 
 
Correspondingly, as shown in Figure 1, the use of 
discourse on the websites of analyzed terrorist 
organizations shows both similarities and differences. 
It is, however, generally inclusive of various 
dimensions of identity frequently used by these 
organizations in their recruitment and propaganda 
activities. 
The usage of constructive strategies together with 
those of justification and relativization is dominant. The 
opposite applies to the usage of strategies of 
perpetuation. Based on the strategies described above, 
this means that the explanation of the very existence 
(with or without mentioning the opponents) plays the 
principal role in the discursive strategic communication 
of all three organizations. Continuation of the status quo 
is, by contrast, communicated as unwanted. 
Combined with the usage of strategies of 
justification and relativization, construction strategies 
claim between 56% and 59% of the total web-page 
based content of each organization. By contrast, all of 
them address the status quo (perpetuation strategies) 
only within 3% to 9%. The way Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985: 108) address such discourse usage, exemplified 
by a material object, gives the best depiction of the 
strategies behind it: “[w]hat is denied is not that such 
objects exist externally to thought, but the rather 
different assertion that they could constitute 
themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions 
of emergence.”  
Differences, on the other hand, are most visible in 
respect to the usage of strategies of transformation 
(13-29%) and strategies of demontage (6-23%). 
Which is, we assume, very much dependent on and 
shaped by different contexts. For example, Gama’a al-
Islamiyya’s major enemy is the secular Government of 
Egypt and, respectively, its policy towards Israel. 
Hence, they share the same political and physical 
space (the state of Egypt) and its (target) population 
with their major opponent. Furthermore, they also 
share the same ethnic and partly the same religious 
identity. In such an environment, from the strategic 
communication perspective, it is less appropriate to 
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use destructive discourse strategies, since it is not 
easy to define opponents as “they”. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Usage of discourse strategies by each organization 
Hezbollah and IEA enemies, though partly different, 
are other countries. Thus, they do not share common 
religious and/or ethnic identities. Such opponents, 
commonly perceived as foreign invaders, allow more 
frequent use of demontage strategies since they are 
easy to locate and describe as they, as others. Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985), in their seminal work Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy, address such rhetoric as “chains 
of equivalence”, that occur when particular and 
different objects are brought to the same level through 
discourse (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) e.g. all those not 
having the same belief, or some other relevant 
dimension of identity, are considered enemies. 
More frequent use of transformation strategies by 
GAI can also be explained in a similar fashion, hence 
with respect to shared ethnic identity and the same 
political/physical space with opponents and target 
audiences simultaneously. In such an environment 
other means and options for strategic communication 
about their own cause, beyond terrorism in the most 
literal sense, are available. The opposite applies for 
Hezbollah and IEA. 
In addition, we also examined the approximate text 
structure and, respectively, the line of argumentation 
of each analyzed article. The dominance of both 
strategies of justification and relativization and the 
constructive strategies continues in this regard as well. 
The opening and the main parts of almost every article 
were most often coded with constructive strategies 
codes. Hence the explanation of who we are and what 
we do occurs not only most, but first as well. This 
strategy is – within the mentioned sections – largely 
supported by emphasizing the difference from the 
others. Thus answering the same question – by using 
the strategies of justification and relativization – but 
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related to opponents. The least used strategies of 
perpetuation appear most frequently in the main part 
of an article. These strategies play a supportive role 
and are commonly applied in order to accentuate the 
unsustainability of the status quo.  
At the same time, the sparse use of the strategies of 
perpetuation serves as a transition to the closing part 
of an online article. The closing part is commonly 
deployed by the strategies of destruction. In this way 
both “negative” strategies support each other by 
locating opponents as actors whose actions are the 
source responsible for the current adverse situation. 
The greatest part of the closing sequence of an article 
is, by means of strategies of transformation, commonly 
dedicated to celebration of already conceptualized 
change.  
During the research process we also detected some 
major differences in the stylistic conception of the 
writings. IEA and GAI use very flowery and 
picturesque language, and put a very strong emphasis 
on religious and ethnic themes. Hezbollah on the other 
hand uses more factual, reduced and accurate 
language and accents religious and ethnic narratives 
less.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
Summarizing the findings of the discourse analysis 
of the writings on the websites of the three terrorist 
groups, evidence suggests that there are similarities in 
usage of various discourse strategies. The 
communication about who we are and what we do – 
thus the deployment of constructive strategies as well 
as those of justification and relativization – plays the 
principal role in discursive construction of terrorist 
identity. In contrast, communications about who they 
are and what they do together with we want the change 
of status quo play almost exclusively supporting roles. 
The latter includes the deployment of strategies of 
demontage, transformation and perpetuation. 
Although attributed with different role importance, 
our analysis shows that constructive strategies 
together with strategies of justification and 
relativization (major role), and strategies of 
perpetuation (supportive role) were deployed to a 
similar degree by all three organizations. Otherwise, 
the analysis indicates considerable differences 
between deployment of strategies of demontage 
(supportive role) and strategies of transformation 
(supportive role). However, the greatest emphasis 
overall lies on religious, resistance and project identity 
narratives, albeit conducted with different stylistic 
means of narrative.  
We assume that the importance of the different 
contexts of emergence and existence for each 
organization is hidden behind the differences. Such 
context-based differences could be the country of 
origin, perceived major enemy, branch of Islam, point 
of origin and historical background, communicated 
main cause etc. Furthermore, as we only analyzed 
three Islamic religious terrorist groups, we 
recommend carrying on with a wider sample by 
including groups with different backgrounds and from 
other regions. An expansion of the amount of coding 
materials would also be recommendable. However, we 
are aware of the fact that, today, social media above all, 
but also traditional websites allow peers to consume 
and interact “without having to disclose much about 
one’s offline identity or qualifications.” (Walther et al., 
2011: 26) 
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In order to come to the aforementioned 
conclusions we applied CDA to terrorist groups’ 
websites, as these deliver easily accessible and 
constant information. Furthermore, this enabled us to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the chosen words in 
the texts (or discourse) on these sites. Other ways to 
explore the identity construction of terrorist group 
members would have been possible with 
interpersonal contact, either by conducting guided 
interviews or observing meetings. However, since 
establishing contact or face-to-face interaction with 
terrorists seems unfeasible, using websites as 
discourse was the most practicable approach.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
[1] Hodges and Nilep (2007) present several CDA case studies 
that deal with discourses in the context of war (mostly in Iraq) 
and (mostly religiously motivated) terrorism. The anthology 
of Schneider and Gräf (2011) is devoted to Islamic counter-
publics on the Internet (however not terrorist). 
[2] Peter Franssen, Julia Kötschau, Kathrin Müller, Elisabeth 
Petersilie, Hua Su and Mubashra Shah belonged to the 
international research team. The authors want to express 
their gratitude to them for their input. 
[3] MAXQDA is a CAQDAS that assists in creating systematic 
evaluations and interpretations of textual data. This software 
was utilized because of its various beneficial features over 
other competing software. Initially, MAXQDA provides a 
teamwork function that allows the creation of a protocol of all 
work of separate team members. Secondly, the software is 
equipped with an advanced memo system that allows the 
organization of notes and insights on text. Thirdly, MAXQDA 
enables its users to have up to four main windows and to link 
different text passages, which makes a complex analysis 
easier to manage. Additionally, the software has an array of 
tools that allow advanced data visualization. It also provides 
users the ability to define variables and export their work to 
Excel or SPSS. Hence, for the purposes of our Critical 
Discourse Analysis, MAXQDA 11 provided ample tools and an 
adequate platform in contrast to other CAQDAS that were also 
tested, such as Atlas.ti, Nvivo, Qualrus and Crawdad. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[4] G. Bird, S. B. Blomberg & G. D. Hess, International Terrorism: 
Causes, Consequences and Cures. The World Economy, 31 (2), 
255 – 274, 2008. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01089.x 
[5] M. Castells, The Power of Identity. Malden/Oxford, England: 
Blackwell, 1997. 
[6] Council on Foreign Relations (2014). Jamaat al-Islamiyya. New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved March 03, 2014, 
from http://www.cfr.org/egypt/jamaat-alislamiyya/p9156 
[7] Council on Foreign Relations (2014). Jamaat al-Islamiyya. New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved September 20, 
2014, from http://www.cfr.org/egypt/jamaat-alislamiyya/p9156 
[8] W. Damon, Social and personality development. New York, NY: 
Norton, 1983. 
[9] E. H. Erikson, Dimensions of a new Identity. New York, NY: 
Norton, 1974. 
[10] C. Heath-Kelly, L. Jarvis & C. Baker-Beall, Editors’ introduction: 
critical terrorism studies: practice, limits and experience, 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7:1, 1-10, 2014. DOI: 
10.1080/17539153.2014.881198 
[11] K. Hirschmann, Terrorismus. Wissen 3000. Hamburg, Germany: 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt/Sabine Groenewold Verlage, 2003. 
[12] A. Hodges & C. Nilep (Ed.), Discourse, War and Terrorism. 
Amsterdam et al., Netherlands: John Benjamins, 2007. 
[13] G. Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and 
Pharaoh. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003. 
[14] P. E. King, Religion and Identity: The Role of Ideological, Social, 
and Spiritual Contexts. Applied Developmental Science, 7(3), 
197-204, 2003. 
[15] G. Kress, Ideological Structures in Discourse. In T. A. van Dijk, 
(Ed.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Discourse Analysis in 
Society (pp. 27-42). London et al., England: Academic Press, 
1985, vol. 4.  
[16] E. Laclau, Metaphor and social antagonisms. In C. Nelson & L. 
Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture 
(pp. 249-257). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1998. 
[17] E. Laclau & C. Mouffe, Hegemony and socialist strategy. 
Towards a radical democratic politics. London, England: Verso, 
1985. 
КУЛТУРА / CULTURE, 11/ 2015  
102 
[18] J. L. Lemke, Identity, Development and Desire: Critical 
Questions. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard & R. Iedema (Eds.), 
Identity Trouble. Critical Discourse and Contested Identities (pp. 
17-42). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
[19] S. V. Marsden & A. P. Schmid, Typologies of terrorism and 
political violence. In A. P. Schmid, (Ed.), The Routledge 
Handbook of Terrorism Research (pp. 158 – 200). London, 
England/ New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 
[20] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (2014). Terrorist Organization 
Profile: al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI). College Park: University 
of Maryland. Retrieved March 03, 2014. Available: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profil
e.asp?id=3760  
[21] A. R. Norton, Hezbollah. A short history. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2009. 
[22] Oxford Islamic Studies Online. (2014). Taliban. Available: 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com 
[23] J. A. Piazza, Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An 
Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal 
Structure. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(1), 62-88, 2009. 
DOI: 10.1080/09546550802544698 
[24] A. Rashid, Taliban. Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in 
central Asia, 2nd ed., New Haven; CT: Yale University Press, 
2010. 
[25] A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf, Violence as Communication. 
Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media. London u.a., 
England: Sage Publications, 1982. 
[26] A. P. Schmid, The Definition of Terrorism. In A. P. Schmid, 
(Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (pp. 39 – 
157). London, England/ New York, NY: Routledge, 2013b. 
[27] N. C. Schneider & B. Gräf, Eds., Social Dynamics 2.0: 
Researching Change in Times of Media Convergence. Berlin, 
Germany: Frank & Timme, 2011. 
[28] The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (2012). Al Gama'a 
Al Islamiyya. West Haven, CT: University of New Haven. 
Retrieved March 03, 2014. Available: http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/ 
Groups/Al_Gama%27a_Al_Islamiyya 
[29] Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (2008 
a). Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends 
and risk (Deliverable 5, Work package 3). Retrieved September 
8, 2013. Available: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/ 
tekst/publications/WP3%20 Del%205.pdf 
[30] T. A. Van Dijk, Ed., Discourse Studies. A multidisciplinary 
Introduction, 2nd ed. London et al., England: Sage, 2011. 
[31] P. Waldmann, Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht. München, 
Germany: Gerling Akademie Verlag, 2001. 
[32] J. B. Walther, C. T. Carr, S. S. W. Choi, D. C. De Andrea, J. Kim, S. 
Tom Tong & B. Van Der Heide, Interaction of Interpersonal, 
Peer, and Media Influence Sources Online. A Research Agenda 
for Technology Convergence. In Z. Papacharissi (Ed.), A 
Networked Self. Identity, Community, and Culture on Social 
Network Sites, (pp. 17-38). New York, NY/ London, England: 
Routledge, 2011. 
[33] R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl & K. Liebhart, (2009). The 
discursive construction of national Identity, 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 
Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
